



# The Next Generation of Safety Standards – Wishful Thinking?

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# Introduction

- Some myths about using standards
- Standards never come as a surprise
- Standards are inconsistent
- Standards are unclear
- Standards are incomplete
- Room for improvement

# Some Myths About Using Standards

1. Following the standards is expensive
  - adequate routines already exist
  - adapting them to a new standard is expensive
2. Most of what the standards require is done anyway
  - reviews, analyses, tests
  - documentation of results
  - justification of design decisions
3. Following a standard does not improve the product
  - same product, different documentation

# Standards never come as a surprise

- They are announced and publicly available long before they are adopted
  - They are discussed and agreed by the affected industries
  - They are a compromise between rivalling interests
- But they are never a surprise!
- So adapting routines and procedures to a future standard can be begun well in advance
    - there's no excuse for not being ready when a standard is adopted

# Standards are inconsistent

- Several standards may apply simultaneously
  - e.g. for computer systems in nuclear power
    - IEC 61508 – Functional safety of E/E/PE safety-related systems
    - IEC 61513 – Nuclear power plants, Instrumentation and control for systems important to safety, General requirements
    - IEC 60880 – Nuclear power plants, Instrumentation and control for systems important to safety, Software aspects...
    - IEEE 7-4.3.2 – IEEE Standard criteria for digital computers...
    - IEEE 1228 – IEEE Standard for software safety plan
  - National regulations and laws can apply in addition, e.g.
    - CE-1001-STD – (Canadian) Standard for Software Engineering of Safety Critical Software
- They have different life cycle models, required activities

# Standards are unclear [1]

- IEC 62278 and IEC 62279 have contradicting definitions e.g. verification and validation:
  - IEC 62278 Validation  
Confirmation by examination and provision of objective evidence that the particular requirements for a specific intended use have been fulfilled
  - IEC 62278 Verification  
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  - IEC 62279 Validation  
activity of demonstration, by test and analysis, that the product meets in all respects its specified requirements
  - IEC 62279 Verification  
activity of determination, by analysis or test, that the output of each phase of the life-cycle fulfils the requirements of the previous phase

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# Standards are unclear [2]

- IEC 61508, IEC 62279 and others classify measures as
  - Mandatory
  - Highly Recommended
  - Recommended
  - Not recommended
  - no recommendation
- No explanation of what the difference is supposed to be
  - Mandatory is clear, but:
  - Highly recommended vs. Recommended
    - how high is highly recommended?
  - Not recommended  $\neq$  forbidden!
    - so it can be used anyway?

# Standards are unclear [3]

- Safety qualification tests: the standards don't say
  - that these are tests to demonstrate the (theoretically) predicted safety characteristics
    - this means the test object should be tested under genuine safety critical operating conditions
    - which is 'illegal', because the safety qualification test is a prerequisite for authorisation to operate!
  - Testing safety characteristics or functions involves generating unsafe conditions
    - Crash tests with cars can be used to test safety functions
    - Crash tests with trains?
    - Crash tests with planes??
    - Nuclear power plants???



# Standards are unclear [3]

- Safety qualification tests (continued)
  - Simulations are of limited value
    - simulations are always based on a model
    - so they cannot behave exactly like the real world
      - timing of events
      - extreme conditions
      - physical stress
  - Simulators must be validated
    - this is seldom done explicitly
    - because the standards don't demand it!
  - Alternative and/or supplement to simulation:
    - probationary authorisation for testing purposes  
field tests under restricted operational conditions
    - but some safety functions might not be tested



# Standards are incomplete

- Safety standards address one particular aspect of safety
  - technical properties of safety instrumentation e.g. IEC 62278
  - safety related software e.g. IEC 62279
  
- Instrumentation and software are not the only means of achieving safety:
  - Administrative procedures
  - Design properties
  - Education and training

# Administrative procedures

## ■ Examples

- Two people required to trigger a nuclear attack
- Standardised verbal communication protocols in air traffic
- Speed limits on roads
  - and/or for specific vehicles
- Load limits for structures
  - tanks or heavy trucks have to cross bridges one at a time
- Operational directives/regulations
  - forbidden to store explosives in a residential area
  - no smoking at fuel pumps
  - concessions required for certain types of business

## ■ There's no standard for administrative safety procedures



# Design properties ("intrinsic safety")

## ■ Examples

### ■ Dimensions

- nuclear radiation has a finite range in concrete, so make the walls thicker than the range

### ■ Electrical properties

- fibre optical cables are immune to electromagnetic interference

### ■ Chemical properties

- use of stainless steel in (sub)marine applications
- predefined pairs of materials in space instrumentation

### ■ Geometry

- exit doors shall open outwards
- blunt corners of tables

## ■ There is no standard for "intrinsic safety"

# Education and training

## ■ Personnel qualification

- Which qualification should a safety engineer have?
  - there are no standardised curricula for safety engineering
  - it is up to the individual to decide what he thinks he needs to know
    - e.g. Markov analysis, Petri nets, risk analysis...
- What is “adequate” experience?
  - a high school degree and how many years learning on the job?
    - several years on the job is no guarantee for quality
- How should the qualification be documented?
  - high school degrees may not address the right areas
  - CV mentions duration of activities, not quality

## ■ There is no standard for safety education and training



# Room for improvement

- In spite of their shortcomings
  - Following standards improves safety
  - Following standards facilitates comparability
  - Following standards is economically sensible
- Standards are to be updated every 5 years
  - Inconsistencies can be removed
  - Clarifications can be made
  - Missing aspects can be included
- The next generation will still be no guarantee for safety
  - But it can come closer!





多谢各位聆聽

Thank you