

Development of a Root Cause Analysis Method for Human-Related Events

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Introduction

- One of the most affecting factors to the safety of human involved facilities is inappropriate human activities (human errors).
- Human activities in NPP operation are very complicated and more than 30% of incidents are attributed to the human related factors. (WANO)
 - Analyzing inappropriate human activities that can have an effect directly or indirectly on complex systems such as NPPs gives insights for the prevention of recurring significant events or near-miss.



Introduction

Events related human errors occur continuously in domestic nuclear facilities


- Reported events (114 events) since 2000 : 26 events (23%)
- Possibility of significant event due to human errors
 - TMI, Chernobyl, and JCO accident are mainly caused by human errors.
- Necessity of decreasing human error rate to secure safety of NPPs



Recent Human Errors in domestic NPPs

Human errors in domestic NPPs

- 2000 ~ 2007.10 : 114 events are reported
 - Human related events : 26 events (22.8%)





Development of RCA method for Human related Events

Necessity


Limitation of time for event investigation• Almost event investigation reports are submitted in a few days. • In the case of U.S NRC : about 45 days for event investigationcan use easilyLimitation of inspectors for event investigation• 2~3 inspectors of OSAD • 1~2 inspectors (experts) of related Dep't as characteristics of eventHuman related event Root cause Analysis MethodLess experiences of RCA about human related• Priority : Inspectors (experts) who have knowledge about event-related parts • When Inspectors do not have knowledge ofMethod	• Necessity		me	thod that an inspector
 inspectors for event investigation 2~3 inspectors of OSAD 1~2 inspectors (experts) of related Dep't as characteristics of event Priority : Inspectors (experts) who have knowledge about event-related parts When Inspectors do not have knowledge of When Inspectors do not have knowledge of 	time for event	are submitted in a few days. ✓ In the case of U.S NRC : about 45	car	
Less experiences of RCA about human related Priority : Inspectors (experts) who have knowledge about event-related parts When Inspectors do not have knowledge of Method 	inspectors for event	1~2 inspectors (experts) of related		event <u>R</u> oot cause
events human engineering	of RCA about	knowledge about event-related parts When Inspectors do not have knowledge of 		
No practical RCA method for human related events Lack of objectivity of analysis results for events Difficulties for establishment of long- term regulation 	method for human related	for events ✓ Difficulties for establishment of long-		



Development of RCA

Development of RCA method for Human related Events

Objective



✓ HuRAM

Development of RCA method for Human related Events

HuRAM (Category & Root Cause)


Root Cause Category	Near Root Cause	Root Cause
Human Engineering (HE)	2	6
Supervision (SUP)	4	9
Training (TR)	4	8
Procedure (PR)	4	24
Communications (COM)	3	10
Management System (MAN)	6	20

HE Category	Root Cause Category	Near Root Cause	Root Cause	
			Inappropriate workplace design	
	Human Engineering (HE)	Deficient human machine interface (HMI) design	Inappropriate labeling	
			Inappropriate task related information	
			Intolerant system design	
		Ctroppful tools on visonment	Inappropriate work environment	
	Stressful task environment		Inappropriate workload	




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Process of HuRAM



HuRAM – Analysis Event Selection Chart



HuRAM – General Guidelines

General Guidelines

General Guidelines			Cate	gory		
	HE	SUP	TR	PR	сом	MAN
(1) If workers and/or crews have to use procedure, did workers and/or crews have procedure that was required for tasks?						
(2) If workers and/or crews have to use procedure, didn't tasks had format or technical problems?						
(3) If workers and/or crews have to use procedure, did workers and/or crews follow procedure exactly?						
(4) Did workers and/or crews have sufficient information, technique or knowledge to perform their tasks?						
(5) Did workers and/or crews have sufficient knowledge or usage about instruments or tools that are indispensable to accomplish their tasks?						
(6) Did workers and/or crews properly use indicators, labels, alarms, controllers, instruments or tools without a wrong manipulation, wrong operation or misreading?]	
(7) Did workers and/or crews carry out their tasks prudently without any indication of excessive fatigue, impairment or inattentiveness?						
(8) Did workers and/or crews carry out their tasks without personnel problems or any stresses?						
(9) Did workers and/or crews perform their tasks under an obvious responsibility?						
(10) If there was a worker and/or crew turnover, was the status about who/what/when in performing a task clearly transferred based on a definite turnover regulation?						
(11) According to the related procedures and/or rules, did workers and/or crews carry out their tasks without a hurry or shortcut?						
(12) Was there any correlation or similarity with a previous event that has been reported from on- site or off-site?						
(13) Were workers and/or crews provided with indicators, labels, alarms, controllers, instruments or tools that are indispensable to accomplish their tasks?						
(14) Did workers and/or crews have to carry out their tasks under an adverse condition including hot, humid, dark, cramped, hazardous or radioactive environment?						

HuRAM – Root Cause Analysis Chart

Root Cause Analysis Chart: HE (Human Engineering)


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	Observed/Identified fact	Example	/ Root Cause	Remark
HE1	Was there no countermeasure to	An accidental actuation had occurred 💊	Intolerant system	
	minimize the accidental actuation of a	because there is no switch protection	design 🗖	
	control?	cover	1	
HE2	Although there was displays and/or	Although each valve has a status 💦 🗸	Inappropriate task-	
	controls, was proper information that	indicator, a maintenance person failed	related information $lacksquare$	
	is congruent with actions and/or	to identify the status of a valve		
	instructions to be carried out by plant	alignment because there was no way to		
	personnel or crews not presented?	check it.		
	Was an alarm or warnings to draw the	There was no warning in a local control		
	attention of plant personnel or crews	panel.		
	not convey detailed information?	\	/	
HE3	Did the design of displays and/or	It is difficult to see the status of fuse	Inappropriate	 MAN/Audits and
	controls not support ergonomics such	because its location is too high	workplace design 🗖	evaluation lack dept
	as the height, the reach or the vision			
	of users?			 MAN/Inadequate
	Were displays and/or controls that are	The status of relay was not identified		organizational culture
	necessary to carry out actions and/or	because the was no indicator about it.		
	instructions not provided?			 MAN/No employee
	Was the performance of actions and/or	An operator felt confusion in controlling		feedback 🗖
	instructions hindered due to	RCPs because of the mirror image of		
	differences in equipment, displays or	RCP controllers.		
	controls between different units or			
	plants?		1	
HE4	Did labels exist on displays, controls	There was no label in a controller.	Inappropriate labeling	 MAN/Audits and
	and equipment?			evaluation lack depth
	Were labels difficult to read or	An operator felt difficulty in reading a]	
	ambiguous?	label because it was small and unclear.		MAN/No employee
				feedback 🗖


Event : Spurious Safety Injection during RCS Heatup

Date of Event : 2006. 5. 7
 Plant Name : Ulchin-1
 Reactor Type : PWR
 Reactor Supplier : Framatome


Event Diagram




Event Diagram



Event Diagram



Event Diagram




Root C	Cause Analysis Chart: SUP (Super	vision)	Root Cause	Remark
SUP 1	Did plant personnel or crews not have crucial resources (information including the effect of failures in actions and/or instructions, related procedures, etc.) that are critical to perform the task?	Maintenance person did not know the importance of an assigned task because there is no indication about the result of failures in carrying out the task.	No preparation	 MAN/Inadequate communication of SPAC MAN/Inadequate organizational culture
SUP2		An operator carried out an critical action.	No supervision 🗖	MAN/Inadequate organizational culture 🗖
SUP3	Did supervisor promptly order additional actions and/or instructions when plant personnel or crews were carrying out their actions or instructions?	A supervisor instantly asked a maintenance person who are carrying out his task to perform additional work.	Inappropriate job plan 🗹	 MAN/Inadequate communication of SPAC MAN/Inadequate organizational culture

✓ (1) Root Cause Category : SUP

Root Cause : Inappropriate job plan

Event Diagram



Root (Cause Analysis Chart: TR (Traiı	ning)		
	Observed/Identified fact	Example	Root Cause	Remark
TR1	Although plant personnel or crews mastered the required KSA (knowledge, skill, ability), did they forget how to apply KSA in performing actual actions and/or instruction?	Although an operating crew was regularly trained how to control the level of SGs during startup, SG level control failed in actual case.	Failure to apply relevant knowledge	
TR2	Were any actions and/or instructions which cause irrelevant human behaviors not included in a training program?	An operating crew did not have sufficient experience about turbine operations under a normal startup condition because of a training program that deals with a limited power condition.	Not training program	

✓ (1) Root Cause Category : SUP

Root Cause : Inappropriate job plan

✓ (2) Root Cause Category : Training


Root Cause : Failure to apply relevant knowledge

Analysis Results using HuRAM

Analyzed Events : 116 in 137 human related events (1986~2006)

Events occurred in Primary System : 37 events


Events occurred in Secondary System : 79 events





Analysis Results using HuRAM






Root Cause Category Primary	
Procedure	22 (30%)
Supervision	18 (23%)
Human Engineering	15 (19%)
Management	11 (14%)
Training	6 (8%)
Communication	5 (6%)
Total	77




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Analysis Results using HuRAM





Root Cause Category	Secondary
Training	42 (34%)
Supervision	26 (21%)
Procedure	26 (21%)
Management	15 (12%)
Communication	8 (6%)
Human Engineering	8 (6%)
Total	125



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Conclusion

- Recent reports show that more than 30% of incidents are attributed to the human related factors.
- It is necessary to have a method for decreasing human error rate to secure safety of NPPs

Necessity & Objective of HuRAM

- Limitation of time and inspectors for event investigation
- Less experiences of RCA about human related events
- No practical RCA method for human related events
- \rightarrow Development of RCA method that an inspector can use easily



Conclusion

HuRAM has

- 6 Categories (HE, SUP, TR, PR, COM, MAN), 77 root causes
- Analysis Target Selection chart, General Guidelines, RCA chart

With HuRAM,

- Assurance of confidence for current investigation results
- Reflection of regulatory policy and/or getting insight from the analyzed results

Further works

- Assuring objectivity of the HuRAM through the improvement and refinement
- Database development for RCA results



Thank you for your attention.



