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A Systemic Approach to a Railway Accident Scenario Analysis Using a Quality Function Deployment

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Background



• Risk assessment of Railway system



Background



Accident Analysis Method										
O FMEA (Failure Mode and Effect Analysis)										
O FTA (Fault Tree Analysis)										
O MORT (Management Oversight and Risk Tree)										
O Fault Hazard Analysis										
O STEP (Sequentially Time Event Plotting)										
O SCAT (Systemic Casual Analysis Technique)										
"At the early stage of risk assessment, These method can be subjective depending on analysts' personal experience										
and be difficult to make a systematic analysis in a general view"										
Accident Scenario Analysis Method										
" Process of understanding, analyzing, and describing accidents and the behavior patterns of										
hazardous conditions" - Cushman and Rosenberg, Human Factors in product design, 1991-										
" Devise a limited number of accident scenarios with descriptions of victims, products,										
environment, and task" - Drury and Brill, Human Factors, 1983-										

Research Objectives



"Although much work has been done to apply scenario analysis to railway accidents, there is still no systematic and formal methodology which identifies generates, analyzes, and verifies accident scenarios, in our view. "

The absence of such a methodology raises questions regarding accuracy and objectivity

Research Objectives



- Inspired by the Quality Function Deployment (QFD) method
 - conventionally used in quality management
 - used at the systematic accident scenario analysis (SASA) for the design of safer products

 The QFD provides a formal and systematic schema to devise accident scenarios while maintaining the objectivity.



Risk Assessment Process



"Risk assessment is tightly coupled with hazard identification and risk reduction"

- The PHA, often called hazard identification, is used in the early life cycle state
 - Identifying critical system functions and system hazard factors.
 - Understanding how hazard factors contribute to railway accidents
 - Understanding, analyzing, and describing the accident process
 - This can be accomplished by applying the accident analysis method



Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)





Quality Function Deployment (QFD)



In QFD, the relationship between customer needs and the quality requirements necessary to produce those needs are charted as House of Quality (HOQ).



Railway Accident Scenario Analysis Approach



Identifying hazardous events & Determining Hazardous Conditions



Step 1: Hazardous events Identification	 This step is probably the most important in that it can pinpoint the safety problems Carried out mainly by gathering various accident-related reports and information to define hazardous events such as collisions, derailments, explosions, etc. A series of hazard evaluation approaches as FMEA, FTA can be also used.
Step 2: Hazardous Conditions Determination	 C characteristics and circumstances surrounding a railway accident. C In case of a product use accident, Drury and Brill makes hazardous conditions composed of a product, a user, a task and an environment. C For railway accidents, this study makes hazardous conditions composed of the four parts: (1) victim, (2) task, (2) environment, and (4) cause.

			Hazardous Conditions											
		Cha	Victim racteris	tics	Cha	Task aracteris	tics	Environment Characteristics			Cause Characteristics			
Hazardous Events	Impor tance	1	2	••	1	2	••	1	2	••	1	2	••	
Hazardous Event 1				Relationship Rating Indication										
Hazardous Event 2					<u> </u>	<u>kelation</u>	<u>snip Ka</u>	<u>ating in</u>	aicatio	<u>n</u>				
•								lations						
•				 △: Moderate relationship (3) ○: Slight or possible relationship (1) 										
Hazardous Event N						Slight o			ltionsn	ip (1)				



Evaluating Relationships

		Hazardous Conditions												
		Cha	Victim Characteristics			Task Characteristics			Environment Characteristics			Cause Characteristic		
Hazardous Events	Impor tance	1	2	••	1	2	••	1	2	••	1	2	••	
Hazardous Event 1						Polotion	ohin D	oting In	diastia	n				
Hazardous Event 2			Relationship Rating Indication											
			©: Strong relationship (5)											
·		△: Moderate relationship (3) ○: Slight or possible relationship (1)												
Hazardous Event N														
Step 3: Evaluating Relationships		the dire The pro - rates the so - evalu - the ra	ect expo oposed the imp everity lates re atings a	erience I metho portanc of the H lations	of the d e of a l nazardo hip by o erally w	sed on QFD de nazardo ous eve comput veighteo licating	velopm ous eve nt (e.g. ing the d with 1	nent tea nt by co equival freque to 5 or	omputi Ient fat ncy. 1 to 9	ng ality pe scales		ntionsh	ip.	

Devising the accident scenarios & Testing the feasibility of the relationships

Hazardous Event N



Step 4: Devising the accident scenarios		scenar For exa four vi three e	he scheme, 'railway accident analysis tableau', creates cenarios from a matrix of all the possible relationships or example, if any hazardous event is related to four victim characteristics, two task characteristics, three environment characteristics, and one cause characteristic, devise a total of 4×2×3×1 = 24 accident scenarios.												
Step 5: Testing the feasibility of the relationships			er out infeasible relationships between elements of the hazardous conditions itigating the need to devise and analyse the accident scenarios												
						На	zardous	Conditio	ons						
		Cha	Victim aracteris	tics	Cha	Task Characteristics			Environment Characteristics			Cause Characteristics			
Hazardous Events	Impor tance	1	2	••	1	2	••	1	2	••	1	2	••		
Hazardous Event 1									diastic						
Hazardous Event 2			Relationship Rating Indication												
					©: Strong relationship (5) △: Moderate relationship (3)										
							derate r pr possi		• • • •			ſ			

Calculating the total weighting & Clustering and Patterning the accident scenarios



		Hazardous Conditions												
			Victim			Task			Environment			Cause		
		Cha	aracteris	stics	Cha	Characteristics			Characteristics			Characteristics		
Hazardous Events	Impor tance	1	2	••	1	2	••	1	2	••	1	2	••	
Hazardous Event 1														
Hazardous Event 2					<u>۲</u>	Relation	<u>snip Ra</u>	ating in	idicatio	<u>n</u>				
•								lations						
•					 △: Moderate relationship (3) ○: Slight or possible relationship (1) 									
Hazardous Event N														
Step 6: Calculating the total weighting		To calculate the total weight for each railway accident scenario, - The importance of the hazardous event is multiplied by each of its corresponding hazardous conditions, - then added together to get the total. The highest ranked railway scenario describes the most hazardous case.												
Step 7: Clustering and Patterning the accident scenarios	0	In orde the clu These p	er to un Istering process	derstar g and pa ses mal	nd the h attering ke the p	many r nazardo j proces propose alysis m	us con sses are d meth	dition t e introc od an e	horoug luced.	hly,	be dea	alt with		

Conclusions



"devise an accident scenario analysis method for creating accident scenarios at the PHA step of a hazard analysis for railway system"

- This approach was inspired by the QFD method.
- In this study, the QFD method provides a formal and systematic schema to devise accident scenarios while maintaining the objectivity.
- The accident scenario analysis method first identifies the hazardous events and explains the hazardous conditions

"Since this method enables an accident scenario analysis to be performed systematically as well as objectively, this method is useful in building better accident prevention strategies"



O This method is useful in building better accident prevention strategies.

O This study could serve to reduce railway accidents and could be an effective tool for a hazard analysis.



Thanks for the attention!

